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biblical theology. I t must be supplemented by contributions such as those
mentioned in the review above. But it does make a distinct contribution to
the subject by bringing together the various points of view of current Roman
Catholic scholarship. For this we are all indebted to the author.
Andrews University
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Hay, David M. Glory at the Right Hand: Psalm 110 in Early Christianity.
Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series, 18. Nashville, Tenn.:
Abingdon, 1973. 173 pp. $5.00.
The author presents a full systematic analysis of the interpretation of Ps 110
in the N T and early Christian writers to the fourth century. Part I provides
background for his study with a history of the interpretation of this passage
first in ancient Judaism and then in early Christianity. T h e Jews had
interpreted Ps 110:l messianically and with reference to this earth, but vs. 4
was rarely applied to the Messiah. In early Christianity, there seems to have
been a dependence on some intermediary source-testimonies, confessions, or
hymns-instead of the O T directly. Ps 110:l was attractive from the point
of view that it could easily relate to Jesus' post-resurrection glory.
With Justin Martyr the whole Psalm, not only vss. 1 and 4 as in the N T ,
was used and understood messianically and christologically. Hay does not
deal here with the source for the writers beginning with Justin, as to
whether this was the OT, the N'T, the intermediary sources, or all three
together.
In Part 11, the author gives a detailed analysis of Christian interpretations
up to the time of Justin to determine the meanings and functions they assigned
to the Psalm. He concludes that there are four major categories of functions:
"expressions of the idea that Jesus or Christians sit at God's right hand, the
use of the psalm to support particular christological titles, its use to affirm
the subjection of powers to Christ, and its employment regarding his heavenly
intercession or priesthood" (p. 155). But there does not seem to be a simple
chronological line of development. He finds many different patterns of interpretation going off in many directions. Obviously the similarities are due
to the Christians' conviction that Jesus was the Messiah and that this Psalm
expressed this fact for them. Beyond this, different passages could be used
differently and no serious difficulty would be felt.
T h e author cites several reasons for the popularity of the Psalm: (1) the
prior Jewish messianic interpretation; (2) its capacity to meet vital religious
needs of Christians, such as providing a scriptural basis for priestly
christology; (3) its affirmation of the supreme exaltation of Christ without
calling into question the glory and sovereignty of God the Father; (4) the
aura of definiteness of a right-hand session for early believers perplexed about
the post-Easter location or precise dignity of their Lord; (5) the attractive
vagueness in the session image which could accommodate a variety of
meanings.
The author has done his work well with surgical precision in discriminating
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between the different functions of the use of this Psalm and has dealt with his
material in a meticulous manner. Only because of his careful analysis and
adeptness of treatment was he able to develop the relative scantiness and
the apparent similarity of the contents of the material with any fullness at all.
Andrews University
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Heimbeck, Raeburne S. Theology and Meaning: A Critique of Metatheological Scepticism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969. 276 pp.
$7.50.
T h e problems of religious language in the philosophical milieu of logical
positivism have been widely discussed in the literature. Heimbeck's book is
a welcome and able attempt to invest the discussion with the precision that
only a truly philosophical mind can provide. Theology and Meaning explores
every side road and alley in its search for all the possible alternatives and
their justifications with respect to the empirical nature, the "factuality," of
God-talk.
This is not to suggest that the book merely summarizes positions. On the
contrary, there are illuminating insights into the subtle presuppositions operating in religious-language philosophizing and a clear analysis of the tendency of some language philosophers to confuse the "criteria" for truth with
the "evidence" for truth, the "checking-conditions" with the "checking-procedures" for verification/falsification. Failure to recognize their differences
obscures the important difference between God statements such as "God
raised Jesus from the dead" (what Heimbeck calls G,-statements) and "God
loves all human beings" (G,-statements). H e points out that "the controversies have centered around discussion of the more complex and tricky G,-statements" (p. 174) which are very different in kind from the GI-statements.
GI-statements can be shown to be empirical in nature; G,-statements cannot.
Nevertheless, Heimbeck demonstrates that G,-statements are the ultimate
warrant for believing the assertions of G,-statements, thus giving to a nonempirical assertion (when looked at b y itself) an empirical basis.
Heimbeck's attack on metatheological skepticism is convincing in many
respects. He shows that God-talk is meaningful even in the restricted sense
of "meaning" employed by the strict "verificationist" thinkers, and that
religious language is cognitively significant.
I have only one objection to the book: its written style. Heimbeck writes
at times with an economy and clarity that carries the reader with him from
point to point. But at other times the reader is barraged with a tortuous,
ponderous phraseology that uses the worst kind of jargon as its weapons,
making the book tedious even for those engrossed in the issues. T h e following
is one example: "There is a parallelism between the argument from criteria
of application of summary designation to application of summary designation
and the synthetic direction of the entailment-rule that backs it up, a parallelism which explains why and how the entailment-rule can serve to back u p
that type of argument. (The same point can be made, of course, for the
argument from the denial of criteria of application to the rejection of the

